A Historical Take on Agency and Institutional Change:The Case of National Advisory Councils in Inter-War Western Europe and the Netherlands by Couperus, Stefan
  
 University of Groningen
A Historical Take on Agency and Institutional Change
Couperus, Stefan
Published in:
Comparativ : Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2014
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Couperus, S. (2014). A Historical Take on Agency and Institutional Change: The Case of National Advisory
Councils in Inter-War Western Europe and the Netherlands. Comparativ : Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte
und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung, 24(1), 18-34.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
A Historical Take on Agency and 
Institutional Change: The Case of 
National Advisory Councils in  




Dieser Artikel hinterfragt die Erklärungskraft des historischen Institutionalismus für die Inter-
pretation institutionellen Wandels. Dazu wird ein dezentrierter Ansatz vorgestellt, der die in-
dividuelle agency von Akteuren konzeptualisiert und historisiert. Als Fallstudie dienen außer-
parlamentarische Gremien in der Zwischenkriegszeit in Westeuropa und in den Niederlanden. 
Indem diese Organisationen und die in ihnen handelnden Personen aus einer Mikroperspekti-
ve untersucht werden, wird gezeigt, dass Erklärungen institutionellen Wandels mit der situated 
agency der historischen Akteure verbunden werden müssen. Damit steht er Interpretationen 
entgegen, die sich auf die Makroebene konzentrieren und institutionellen Wandel als evolutio-
när betrachten. 
1. Introduction
The new institutionalism, which gained prominence in social and political science from 
the late 1980s onwards, has significantly changed the epistemology of institutions in 
scholarly work. An important school of thought within this field of study, stresses the 
temporal dynamics of institutions, and has become known as ‘historical institutional-
ism’. Leaning heavily towards the terminology of path-dependency, scholars have ad-
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dressed the issue of institutional change in time since the late 1990s. This has resulted in 
a productive debate about the theoretical and methodological implications of the empiri-
cal study of institutional change. However, historical contingency and agency is largely 
missing in their explanatory matrices, particularly with regard to the way in which insti-
tutional change is addressed. 
This contribution aims to explore the ways in which another perspective on institutions 
might bridge the gap between the claims of explanation, and the more historicist and 
humanist approaches to institutions. In their book The State as Cultural Practice, the 
political scientists Bevir and Rhodes make a strong case for a more decentred interpretive 
take on institutions, conceiving institutions not as actors in themselves but as contingent 
constructs of individual human action.1 
Relating it to some topical historical institutionalist propositions to deal with institu-
tional change and agency, this article will highlight the particular approach and concep-
tual framework that it adopts in the first section. It will also elaborate on the approach’s 
(partial) indebtedness to a dualist conception of institutions loosely derived from An-
thony Giddens’s path-breaking work on structuration. Secondly, the precondition for 
presenting the argument in this article – the historical and historiographical context of 
the test-case – will be outlined: inter-war advisory bodies in the socio-economic realm 
in Western Europe in general, and in the Netherlands in particular. Then the article will 
present a historical institutionalist reading of these advisory councils, allowing for what 
Charles Tilly called the explanation of ‘big structures’, ‘large processes’, and making ‘huge 
comparisons’.2 Subsequently, the article will point at the value of a decentred, interpre-
tive approach that brings forth a historical understanding of institutional practice and 
change on rather different terms. It will do so by probing into the micro-level practice 
of some inter-war advisory councils in the Netherlands. Finally, this article aims to show 
how an agency-centred historical inquiry into institutions might allow us to grasp the 
complex dynamics of institutional change by diverting from the explanatory language 
and reification that is ascribed to historical institutionalist readings of change. 
2. Historical institutionalism and decentred interpretation:  
     change-agents and situated agency 
Proponents of historical institutionalism (HI) share a set of assumptions that are key to 
their understanding of ‘how institutions evolve’. Essentially, they adhere to some notion 
of path dependency – the idea that ‘what has happened at an earlier point in time will 
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’.3 
Once put in place, institutions tend to become ‘sticky’, implying a conservative attitude 
 M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice, Oxford 200.
2 C. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York 984.
 W. H. Sewell, Three temporalities: Toward an eventful sociology, in: T. J. McDonald (ed.), The Historic Turn in the 
Human Sciences, Ann Arbor 996, pp. 245-280, at p. 26.
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towards (radical) change and a tendency to signify continuities by the subsequent repro-
duction of a particular institution. Furthermore, a particular conception of temporality 
or historicity is included in their theoretical propositions. Institutions are not looked 
at as a ‘snapshot’. Instead, they are subjected to a developmental analysis over a certain 
period of time that entails decades or centuries rather than years.
Theorists of historical institutionalism have embarked on an intensive dialogue about the 
epistemological consequences of their work, most notably about the methodology and 
tools needed to explain institutional change. At the heart of this debate is the accept-
ance of some degree of incremental change of institutions over time which is generated 
by a set of endogenous mechanisms – as opposed to the ‘critical junctures’ which are 
regarded as creations primarily enforced by exogenous shocks. Although some recent 
contributions to the debate claim otherwise,to a large extent agency has generally been 
conceptualized as a subordinate factor in explaining endogenous change.
The focus has shifted from more radical modes of change – instances of contingent 
‘path creation’ at some critical juncture at which the parameters of future development 
are (re)set – to theoretical reflections on gradual and evolutionary institutional change. 
Culminating from a long-pending debate is a well-elaborated ‘theory of gradual change’, 
most comprehensively forwarded by the sociologists Thelen and Mahoney.4
The key to this theory is the assumption that once created institutions are not subjected 
to an era of relative stasis – which most neo-institutionalist analyses infer – but instead 
fit into a pattern of gradual changes or adjustments inherent to institutions. Building 
on a burgeoning corpus of change theory, Thelen and Mahoney propose four modes of 
gradual change that reflect the way in which institutions tend to evolve. They take both 
the ‘characteristics of the political context and the institution in question’ into account 
which shape what they phrase “the dominant change-agent”.5 
These modes of gradual institutional change comprise displacement (the removal of one 
set of rules for a new one), layering (a new set of rules on top or alongside existing ones), 
drift (changing impact of existing rules due to environmental changes) and conversion 
(a redeployment of existing rules). The so-called change-agents’ actions coincide with a 
certain mode of institutional change. According to Thelen and Mahoney, “the character 
of existing institutional rules and the prevailing political context are again the key ex-
planatory factors” of institutional change. To them “agents become the intervening step 
through which the character of institutional rules and political context do their causal 
work”.6 They incorporate social interaction between agents into their explanatory matrix 
by adding the impact of ‘coalitional dynamics’ to institutional change as a key factor. 
In this explanatory language, change-agents – or human agency – is still more or less sub-
ordinate to institutions (rules) and environment. It is a cog that provides for the ‘causal 
4 J. Mahoney and K. Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, in: idem (ed.), Explaining Institutional 
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, Cambridge 200, pp. -7.
5 Ibid., p. 5.
6 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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work’ that is taking place within the kaleidoscopic matrix of time-space. Change-agents, 
in contrast, might also be considered as the starting point of analysis rather than as the 
missing link in change theory.
For such an agency-driven approach, constructivist or discursive institutionalists provide 
us with relevant impetus.7 Vivien Schmidt argues, for instance, that institutional change 
is by all means agency-driven: “one could consider how agents get beyond their institu-
tional constraints, with ideas conveyed through discourse having a causal effect on their 
environment.”8
In a way, such an approach is derived from Anthony Giddens’s famous idea about the 
‘duality of structure’. It suggests, in accordance with Giddens, an inextricable mutually 
constitutive and dialectic relation between ‘structural properties of social systems’ and 
the historical agents. This historical process of structuration entails a presupposition of 
agency and structure: agents’ actions are incited and limited by ‘rules and resources, 
organised as properties of social systems’. Yet, at the same time these rules and resources 
exist merely by the grace of human enactment through which they are reproduced and 
petrified – as institutions.9 
Despite legitimate questions about the conceptual clarity of Giddens’s theory and propo-
sitions to rethink structuration in different terms, its key assumptions of duality might 
contribute to a heuristic framework for historical research on the development of institu-
tions.10 However, similar to historical institutionalism, the theory of structuration seems 
to downplay modes of institutional change in favour of modes of reproduction and 
continuity. Change is hard to pinpoint when adopting a structuration framework. Since 
agents’ actions are engrained in structures, and structures are in turn acted out by agents, 
the reproductive process of structuration in essence does not disclose patterns of change 
other than those emerging from the dialectics between structure and agency. 
In my opinion, institutional change, as an object of historical inquiry, has to be sought 
on a conceptual grounding that diverts from the explanatory language of historical insti-
tutionalists. It proceeds from Giddens’s framework of duality, but at the same instance 
encapsulates a particular notion of agency-driven institutional change as promoted by 
constructivist institutionalists. 
I would like to argue in favour of the decentred interpretive approach adopted by the 
political scientists Rod Rhodes and Mark Bevir. Their perspective offers a yielding mid-
  7 For an elaborate explanation of constructivist or discursive institutionalism see: C. Hay, ‘Constructivist Instituti-
onalism’, in: R. A. W Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, 
Oxford 2006, pp. 56-74. For a recent debate on the purport of discursive institutionalism see: S. Bell, Do We Really 
Need a New ‘Constructivist Institutionalism?’, in: British Journal of Political Science, 4 (20) 4, pp. 88-906; V. 
Schmidt, A Curious Constructivism: A Response to Professor Bell, in: British Journal of Political Science, 42 (202) 
, pp. 705-7.
  8 V. Schmidt, A Curious Constructivism, p. 70 (footnote 7).
  9 A. Giddens, Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction of social analysis, Berkeley 
979, pp. 66-69.
0 For a very elaborate critique on Giddens’s vocabulary see: W. H. Sewell, Logics of history: Social theory and social 
transformation, Chicago 2005, pp. 27-7.
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way between historical and constructivist institutionalism. They take the primacy of the 
agency argument a step further, but still implicitly adhere to Giddens’s idea of duality 
of structure.11 Key to Bevir and Rhodes’ understanding of institutions is what they call 
‘situated agency’. They share a post-foundationalist postulation in human agency, imply-
ing there is no autonomous self who acts on the basis of pure experience or reason. Bevir 
and Rhodes thus radically move away from rational choice. According to them, human 
action is triggered within a web of beliefs in a particular social context. Agency is the 
simple capacity of an individual to adopt beliefs – also new ones – and pursue actions.
Accordingly, institutional change depends on the human reflection on at least two social 
constructs: tradition and dilemma. Tradition is defined as “a set of understandings some-
one receives during socialization” that is consequently a product of situated agency.12 
Traditions should always be understood in the circumstances where they are applied. 
Dilemmas generate a certain choice of action for an agent. Fostered by their beliefs 
and experiences, human actors decide what kind of (discursive) action they will pursue 
– therewith affecting the web of beliefs.13 Subsequently, institutional change amounts to 
the “pushing and pulling of a tradition and a dilemma to bring them together”.14 This 
dynamic allows for a very different explanatory reading – at shop floor level – of insti-
tutional change that chooses historicist and humanist informed explanations through 
decentred interpretation over neo-institutionalist registers of explanation. 
As a test case for this decentred, interpretative approach, this paper addresses the history 
of inter-war advisory councils in Western Europe with a particular focus on the Nether-
lands. Before being able to employ such a reading of institutional practice and change, it 
is necessary to introduce the historical case study to some extent.
3. Beyond corporatism: readings of inter-war advisory councils  
     in Western Europe
During the inter-war period public administration witnessed a fundamental acceleration 
of displacement and delegation of governance practices in Western Europe. Burgeoning 
state interventionism was accompanied by a nexus of new or expanded institutions that 
became increasingly engaged in procedures of decision and rule making – and keeping. 
From the outside of the state apparatus, in the extra-parliamentary realm of governance, 
a variety of professionals, experts and (representatives of ) interest groups were clustered 
around – or (partly) placed within the structure of – the administrative state in order 
to render particular expertise, generate societal consent for policies, and to enable the 
 Two collaborative accounts present the main outlines and epistemological postulations of their interpretive ap-
proach: M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, Governance Stories, New York 2006, pp. -2; M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, 
The State as Cultural Practice, pp. 6-00 (footnote ).
2 M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, Governance Stories, p. 8 (footnote ).
 M. Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, Cambridge 999, pp. 22-264.
4 M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, Governance Stories, p.  (footnote ).
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outsourcing of regulatory, supervisory, executive and – in some cases – legislative tasks. 
Myriad advisory councils, as they were usually referred to, gave impetus to an emerging 
politics of consultation that reconfigured the relations between voluntary associations, 
interest groups and third party experts, and legislators, administrators and executive of-
ficials of the state. 
Various renown commentators of the time coined the terms for this nexus of advisory 
councils: Spezialparlemente (the German legal philosopher Georg Jellinek), voorparle-
menten (pre-parliaments, the Dutch socialist leader P. J. Troelstra), l’administration 
consultative (the French jurist Georges Hauriou), parliaments of industry (the English 
political thinker Herman Finer) or corporatisme mixte (the Romanian intellectual M. 
Manoïlesco).15 
It is exactly this intermediate sphere of governance that has attracted scholarly interest 
by political and social historians. For the last decade or so, extra-parliamentary advisory 
bodies have been part of the new historical readings of inter-war politics and administra-
tion. By moving away from the reiterations of accepted institutions, such as parliaments, 
governments, state departments, political parties and elections, a range of new questions 
have been posed about the nature of governance practices within the maturating – and 
contested – democratic polities of, for instance, France, Weimar Germany, Belgium and 
Britain. Furthermore, recent theories on the nature of political representation and on 
the historicity of political institutions have enabled scholars to review inter-war politics 
through a new lens. 
Existing neo-corporatist scholarship, with its emphasis on the (success of ) conciliation of 
colliding economic interests within a state-controlled, multipartite institutional edifice, 
tends to embrace normative assessments of extra-parliamentary governance. Whether it 
is a democratic benchmark (in terms of representativeness or the degree of subordination 
to national parliaments) or a functional evaluation (do neo-corporatist arrangements de-
liver?), neo-corporatists have not touched upon the historical contingency of governance 
practices and the concomitant issues of legitimacy. 
This has had two impacts on the study of interwar politico-administrative institutions. 
Firstly, ‘corporatism’ has been associated with the ‘tainted’ institutions of the inter-war 
period, particularly those of authoritarian corporatist states such as Portugal, Austria 
and Italy, resulting in an a priori exclusion of inter-war extra-parliamentary, representa-
tive institutions from historical analyses of democratic governance. Secondly, pre-1940 
corporatist arrangements have mainly been labelled as failed experiments that were un-
able to conciliate capital and labour, or inter-war corporatist institutions are explained 
5 G .Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung, Berlin 90; M. Manoïlesco, Le siècle du corporatis-
me: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur, Paris 96; H. Finer, Representative Government and a Parliament 
of Industry: A Study of the German Federal Economic Council, London 92; E. Hueting, F. de Jong, and R. Neij, 
Troelstra en het model van de nieuwe staat, Assen 980; A. Chatriot, Les apories de la représentation de la socié-
té civile. Débats et expériences autour des compositions successives des assemblées consultatives en France au 
XXe siècle, in: Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel 7 (2007) , pp. 55-555.
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as deadlocks by taking the efficacy of post-war neo-corporatism rather anachronistically 
as the yardstick.
The current agenda of research sharply diverts from these conclusions. Being one of the 
initiators of a ‘new’ political history, Pierre Rosanvallon has broached the possibilities of 
subjecting modern French political history to a non-Jacobinist – and thus less essential-
ist – historical interpretation that moves away from the classical tenets of parliamentary 
democracy as the objects of study, and incorporates a much richer amalgam of intra- and 
extra-parliamentary political institutions.16 
One significant contribution to this agenda of research, with regard to inter-war advisory 
bodies is Alain Chatriot’s study of the Conseil national économique (CNE). It is indeed 
one of the (representative) institutions constituting a mode of l’administration consulta-
tive in France from 1925 onwards.17 Recent inquiries into the more remote political 
institutions of the Weimar Republic have shown a lively practice of extra-parliamentary 
governance which ultimately was thwarted by Hitler’s rise to power in the early 1930s. 
Joachim von Wedel, for instance, has convincingly inserted the (Vorläufige) Reichswirt-
schaftrat (RWR, 1920–1933), a constitutionally defined advisory council, into his his-
torical narrative of German bicameralism and parliamentarism.18 Joachim Lilla has pub-
lished lengthy ‘biographies’ of the RWR and other representative bodies with the explicit 
aim to assess these advisory councils on their own merits.19 
Another indication for scholarly interest in ‘corporatist’ bodies – state-endorsed delibera-
tive platforms that facilitated the articulation of aggregation of branch interests such as 
agriculture, industry, trade, banking, transport, crafts etc. – is the annotated reissue of an 
influential comparative study between the main French and German advisory councils 
first published in 1929.20 In British historiography, the work of Keith Middlemas, Susan 
Howson and Donald Winch, and W. H. Greenleaf, and more recently Chris Howell’s 
book on the relation between trade unions and the state, and Michael Moran’s work on 
the regulatory British state, offers myriad clues to arrive at a history of extra-parliamen-
tary governance in Britain that is not merely preoccupied with Whitehall or parliamen-
tary affairs.21 
As extra-parliamentary institutions contributing to politico-administrative practices pro-
liferated in (Western) Europe during the inter-war period, other national cases are still 
6 P. Rosanvallon, Le Peuple Introuvable. Histoire de la Représentation Démocratique en France, Paris 998; Pierre 
Rosanvallon, La Légitimité Démocratique. Impartialité, Réflexivité, Proximité, Paris 2008.
7 A. Chatriot, La Démocratie Sociale à la Française. L‘expérience du Conseil National Économique 924–940, Paris 
2002.
8 J. von Wedel, Zur Entwicklung Des Deutschen Parlamentarischen Zweikammersystems, Berlin 20.
9 J. Lilla, Der Vorläufige Reichswirtschaftsrat 920 bis 9/4. Eine Dokumentation. Unter Einschluss des Wirt-
schaftsbeirats des Reichpräsidenten 9 und des Generalrats der Wirtschaft 9, Düsseldorf 202.
20 F .Glum, Der deutsche und der französische Reichswirtschaftsrat ein Beitrag zu dem Problem der Repräsentati-
on der Wirtschaft im Staat, Berlin 20 [929].
2 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 9, London 979; S. 
Howson and D. Winch, The Economic Advisory Council, 90-99, Cambridge 977; W. H. Greenleaf, The British 
Political Tradition, London 987; M. Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-innovation, 
Oxford 2007; C. Howell, Trade Unions and the State, New Jersey 2005.
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waiting to be scrutinized – as well as the interwar transnational attempts to create a set 
of functional representative organs to regulate supranational trade, agriculture, traffic, 
labour and finance in Europe. However, the inter-war advisory bodies also offer an in-
teresting object of study through the lens of historical institutionalism. They were inser-
tions into many (new) national polities and were subjected to critical reflections from 
the very beginning by advocates and antagonists of democracy alike. Advisory bodies had 
to invent their own best practices in a period during which political relations, societal 
stability and economic conditions were continuously under pressure. This context allows 
for an explanatory narrative that particularly underlines the impact of the historical cir-
cumstances on institutional change, as will be set out below.
4. A look at inter-war advisory councils: a historical institutionalist reading
The scarce publications that probe into the actual practices of these advisory bodies 
all share a common focus despite the rather diverging methodological and conceptual 
postulations they pertain. With regard to the institutional origins or characteristics of 
inter-war advisory bodies, explanations tend to centre on a number of structural changes 
in the relation between state and society. These changes occurred as part of what Jürgen 
Habermas described as the dual – and dialectic – process of a ‘societalization’ of the state 
and a ‘stateification’ of society. They are often related to processes of re-corporatisation 
which started in the last third of the nineteenth century. This process refers to the re-
emergence of social collectives (e.g. trade unions) after the liberal interlude incited by the 
French Revolution, during which collectives (e.g. guilds) were abolished.22
Therefore, the institutional genesis (or ‘path creation’ process) of grand inter-war advi-
sory councils, which all incorporated elements of group representations, is dated from 
the late nineteenth century onwards. At national and subnational levels, a variety of 
representative bodies were installed, ranging from local multipartite boards of industrial 
arbitration and negotiation to councils for governmental consultation, consisting of vo-
cational and socio-economic interest groups.23 Examples of such councils are the Prus-
sian Volkswirtschaftsrat (1880), the Belgian Conseils de l’industrie et du travail (1889) and 
Conseil supérieur du travail (1892) and the French Conseil supérieur du travail (1891).24
The post-Versailles era was entered through a critical juncture at which the intermediate 
level between the state and socio-economic organised interests became a predominantly 
22 J. Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society, 
Cambridge 989, p. 42. Similar remarks of the Dutch historian Jan Romein have been first published posthu-
mously in 967. Romein phrased this process the “mutual permeation of state and society’” See: J. Romein, Op 
het breukvlak van twee eeuwen, Amsterdam 976, pp. 52-82, at pp. 69-70.
2 For a classic account of this history see: A. Black, Guild & State: European political thought from the twelfth 
century to the present, New Brunswick 200.
24 C. A. Craig, Germany 866–945, Oxford 999, p. 57; J. Deferme, Uit de ketens van de vrijheid: het debat over de 
sociale politiek in België, 886–94, Leuven 2007, pp. 207-260; P. Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms 
of the Social Environment, Chicago 989, p. 28. 
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national affair of state consultation, co-governance, (self-)regulation and interventionist 
policy-making. Considering the context of defining national positions within the largely 
undefined relations of global trade and industry of the early 1920s, governments re-
sorted to broad consultations prior to the ratification of bipartite trade treaties. In many 
Western European countries, good experiences with the co-management of (food) dis-
tribution and wartime crisis policies, which involved the acceptance of many voluntary 
associations, particularly trade unions, as partners in governance by the state, fostered 
a sustainable acknowledgement of the presence of organized interests in governmental 
affairs after the war. Moreover, as many (new) states entered a process of (re)defining 
and ratifying new national constitutions, advisory councils representing the national 
economy as a whole were subjected to procedures of legal enactment, either within the 
constitution (such as in Poland and Weimar Germany, article 165 of the new constitu-
tion) or in adjacent laws (most other European states).25 
In a nutshell, the restoration of a global (economic) order, the wartime collaboration 
between the state and organized interests, and national constitutional demands were the 
main exogenous drivers of institutional change which ultimately manifested itself in the 
installation of a host of economic advisory bodies such as the Vorläufige Reichswirtschaft-
srat in Weimar Germany (1920), the Conseil national économique in France (1925) and 
the Commissie voor den Economischen Politiek in the Netherlands (1917, re-installed in 
1927 [CEP]).26
In the literature, their raison d’être and functioning is to a large extent linked to state di-
rectives, regardless of the formal or informal tasks (ranging from legislative mandates to 
mere advisory work on request) these advisory councils were committed to. The advisory 
bodies allowed for the articulation of societal (group) interests otherwise not represented 
in public politics. They provided the state with an instrument to channel and conciliate 
social and economic interests as a means to promote stable relations between conflicting 
organized interest groups and between these groups and the state. 
Another line of reasoning forwards these advisory bodies as deliberative arenas in which 
ideological charged issues could be discussed in terms that diverged from partisan dis-
course in parliament. In this reading, advisory bodies were a platform for techno-admin-
istrative debates on complex policy issues being kept at a distance from parliamentary 
decision-making. In similar vein, advisory bodies were able to provide government and 
its agencies with knowledge and expertise unavailable in state bureaucracy or parliamen-
tary politics. 
Consequently, fundamental changes in the institutional layout of these advisory bodies 
in the course of the 1930s are related to certain needs of the state, mainly the urgency 
25 For an exhaustive overview of inter-war advisory councils with regard to socio-eocnomic affairs see: E. Lindner, 
Étude sur les conseils économiques dans les différents pays du monde: préparée pour le Comité Économique, 
Geneva 92.
26 J. Lilla, Der Vorläufige Reichswirtschaftsrat (footnote 9); A. Chatriot, La Démocratie Sociale (footnote 7); P. E. de 
Hen, Actieve en re-actieve industriepolitiek in Nederland: de overheid en de ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse 
industrie in de jaren dertig en tussen 945 en 950, Amsterdam 980.
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with regard to the solution of the perceived functional (not enough expertise or knowl-
edge for well-designed interventionist policies) or representative (absence of the articula-
tion of certain social or economic interests in the legislature) deficits at certain instances, 
particularly during post-Versailles transitional politics and during the crisis of the 1930s. 
In general, one can discern a transformation of the grand representative bodies of the 
early 1920s into smaller overarching boards of (mainly) experts – not interest representa-
tives per se – who coordinated the advisory work of subordinate committees. In some 
cases, for example in the United Kingdom (Economic Advisory Council, 1930) and the 
Netherlands (Economische Raad (ER), 1932), this resulted in the installation of a new 
advisory board of experts.27 It should be noted that myriad critics (e.g. technocrats, com-
munists, fascists, corporatists, Catholics) also promoted such expert bodies as solutions 
to the alleged shortcomings of parliamentary decision-making and state-bureaucracy 
from the 1920s onwards.
The importance that is consequently vested in exogenous shocks resulting from eco-
nomic, social and political crises, rather easily fit the logic and terminology of histori-
cal institutionalism. However, by defining the state as the main ‘change-agent’ and by 
conceptualizing state-society relations as the strongest driver for change something else is 
largely neglected or at least downplayed. 
What is lacking at large is the inscription of agency into these advisory bodies them-
selves. Rather than being a technology of state interventionism per se, advisory bodies’ 
members or drawees generated their own dynamics. This dynamic was not exclusively 
rendered by governmental actions, orders or interferences. By probing into a Dutch 
case which from a HI perspective fits the explanatory narrative of institutional change 
enunciated above, I will argue that a decentred take on advisory councils discloses a dif-
ferent view on institutional practice and change that centres on the ‘situated agency’ of 
historical actors. 
5. The case of the Netherlands: agency-driven institutional change
The Dutch case offers a promising, though complex, field of inquiry because its history 
shows much minor and major change in the institutional set-up of national advisory 
bodies. Complex because due to the organization of voluntary associations along the 
lines of ideological – ‘pillarized’ – blocks, the incorporation of socio-economic interests 
as a whole into a practice of l’administration consultative proved very difficult and trou-
blesome. 
Economic interests were not only horizontally clustered around perceived aggregated 
interests of a specific trade or sector or profession (e.g. industry, agriculture, transport, 
27 S. Howson and D. Winch, The Economic Advisory Council (footnote 2); J. A. Nekkers and W. H. Salzmann, Een 
“Heilzaam Orgaan in Ons Staatsleven”? De Economische Raad Als Deskundigencollege 92–98, in: Econo-
misch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek, 5 (990), pp. 9-224.
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shopkeepers, wholesalers), but were also fragmented within certain functional or voca-
tional groups, even at the subnational level. For instance, in one city or municipality one 
could find a catholic, liberal (neutral), and protestant shopkeepers’ association which 
also translated into a similar co-existence of (competing) national organisations. 
Other than, for instance, France or Germany, the overarching national advisory councils 
did not constitute the top of a territorially built-up pyramid of organized interests. Rath-
er, they comprised equally represented national organisations with clear confessional or 
ideological signatures. Consequently, the history of the Dutch advisory councils of the 
inter-war period is also an episode during which experimentation to overcome or ac-
commodate ideological deadlocks in Dutch politics and society took place. Advisory 
councils, other than parliament, did not have to relate to an abstract common good 
in concordance with ideological dogmas. Instead, it was a ‘partial’ interest, couched in 
terms of one trade, one sector or one profession that, at least in theory, would allow for 
a non-partisan, technical articulation of a shared interest.
To make it even more complex, alongside the grand advisory councils that aimed to 
represent the Dutch economy as a whole, councils representing a particular trade or 
sector which became acknowledged by the state as official advisory bodies as well (e.g. 
the Industrial Council of manufacturers, the Council of the Self-Employed) were also 
initially developed from the bottom up. 
From the end of the First World War until the crises of the early 1930s, this implied 
an institutional constellation of sub- and co-ordinate advisory councils who all claimed 
to represent (part) of the Dutch economy and whose interrelations – or its relation to 
government and its agencies – were not clearly fixed by regulations or law. In theory, all 
councils were entitled to advice the government unsolicited or to receive consultation 
requests by the government to a similar degree. 
This is not the right place to go into detail about the contribution of individuals within 
each advisory council. However, one can discern a number of beliefs and experiences 
that tend to correspond with the position of individuals who render the practices of 
consultation and governmental advising in general terms. This is where the idea of ‘situ-
ated agency’ becomes useful, not through ethnographic enquiry, as proposed by Rhodes 
and Bevir for contemporary cases, but by combining a variety of texts from the available 
archival records. 
In the minutes of many meetings, in the correspondence between councils and state agen-
cies or among council members, certain individuals become visible as the main agents 
in daily practice. These actors can roughly be found among five groups of participants 
of which the first three are highly relevant in the following analysis: state delegates (civil 
servants), the responsible ministers, members (mainly chairmen) of the advisory coun-
cils’ executive boards, invited ad hoc experts, and the members of the advisory councils 
who represent national voluntary associations with a specific ideological signature.
Putting aside the earlier mentioned dynamics in politics and industry as exogenous driv-
ers of change, I will show now how beliefs, experiences and orientations – and the tra-
ditions they are rooted in – of a number of individual actors posed feasible dilemmas 
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that eventually marshalled institutional change from ‘within’. The analysis focuses on 
the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the years during which the CEP – the ambitiously 
set-up economic advisory council of 1917 that claimed to represent the economy as a 
whole – became idle and superfluous and a new overarching advisory body was installed 
that capitalized on expert input in the politics of consultation, the Economic Council 
(Economische Raad, founded in 1932). 
While scrutinizing the archival records of both generic advisory councils, as well as prob-
ing into the materials about the more specific Industrial Council and the Council of the 
Self-Employed, one striking conclusion has to be drawn. The activities and meetings 
of all advisory councils did only relate partially to the actual substance and procedures 
of governmental consultation. Rather, the councils proved to be a platform on which 
the opaque relational matrix between government, state bureaucracy, interest groups, 
advisory bodies, and (scientific) expertise was negotiated, discussed and rendered visible. 
This particular setting of extra-parliamentary politics, institutionalised in an intermedi-
ate sphere between state and society, allowed for a mode of ‘situated agency’ of which the 
tradition or social discourse was highly undetermined, giving rise to a context of novel 
actions and creative innovation by historical human agents.28 A few of these ‘situated 
agents’ will now be presented as part of an attempt to grasp the institutional change 
within the realm of inter-war Dutch advisory bodies. 
It is worth to point out one civil servant who operated as the state delegate in all above-
mentioned councils, F. K. J. Heringa, a former marine official who was the so-called head 
of the section Trade and Industry of the national department of economic affairs starting 
in 1921. As ministers rarely attended the meetings of the advisory councils themselves, 
council members experienced Heringa as both the delegate of the minister as well as the 
representative of the department of economic affairs – he was the minister’s advocate as 
well as the guardian of red-tapism. As such, Heringa was held accountable for the many 
cases in which government had not consulted its ‘formal’ advisory councils with regard 
to policy-making. At the same time, he had to confront the councils’ members with the 
expansion of bureaucratic autonomy within the departments which in many cases im-
plied the creation of alternative procedures of advice or consultation for government. 
Heringa fought many battles with the councils’ members, boards and, in particular, chair-
men. During the councils’ meetings and in correspondences Heringa frequently gave ac-
count of his irritation and discomfort with the advisory councils. 29 In 1928, discord with 
the Industrial Council, a body which combined many renown Dutch manufacturers and 
entrepreneurs, resulted in Heringa’s refusal to ever attend meetings again.30 Although 
Heringa at occasions still attended meetings, his input was diminishing. With Heringa as 
the gatekeeper between the Industrial Council and government, the Industrial Council 
28 N. Choi, Situated Agency, in: M. Bevir (ed.), Encyclopedia of Governance, Thousand Oaks 2007, pp. 87-874.
29 National Archives The Hague [NA], Archive Ministry of Economic Affairs, Direction Trade and Industry (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken, Directie Handel en Industrie) [DTI], inv.nr. 040, correspondence VWN and depart-
ment, 5 April 926 and 9 May 926.
0 NA, Archive Industrial Council (Nijverheidsraad) [IC], inv.nr. 0, minutes January and February 928.
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was increasingly surpassed or even neglected in advisory procedures as a result. Heringa’s 
successor, the highly independently operating H. M. Hirschfeld completely ignored the 
existing advisory councils and, together with his superior, minister T. J. Verschuur, de-
signed a whole new institutional configuration for the politics of consultation.
All subsequent ministers displayed a personal preference toward their means of consulta-
tion during the inter-war period. After its installation in 1917, the grandly devised CEP 
(24 to 30 members who all represented a particular economic interest) seldom convened 
plenary. Most ministers did not feel the urge to debate policy issues with such a diverse 
and inherently juxtaposed set of people. Instead, ministers decided to deliberate with a 
much smaller sub-commission of the CEP in which they additionally appointed experts 
from their own professional or personal networks by the mid 1920s. To put it differ-
ently, ministers of economic affairs such as D.A.P.N. Koolen (1925), J. R. Slotemaker de 
Bruine (1926–1929) and T. J. Verschuur (1929–1934) all remained hesitant towards the 
plenary CEP. They rather activated a blend of CEP’s delegates and experts as an advisory 
board which officially resorted under the CEP as a sub-commission, but in practice 
resembled much of the proven experiences with informal, unofficial old boys meetings 
familiar to many well-educated public officials. In short, the efficacy of an advisory coun-
cil, and the extent to which the government applied to it, to a large degree depended on 
the quality of personal interaction between high echelon civil servants and the councils’ 
executive boards. These social interactions reveal many colliding traditions and dilem-
mas that stemmed from an increasingly diverging set of beliefs and orientations which, 
in turn, were highly specific for each agent.
As civil servants increasingly fostered an agenda of bureaucratic autonomy which com-
prised the development of an independent departmental politics of consultation and 
ministers favoured their own beliefs and hands-on experiences with consultation, the 
executive boards of the advisory councils, with their protracted chairmanships, tried to 
define the merits of their bodies on their own terms. 
The chairman of the Industrial Council, the former minister F. E. Posthuma (chairman 
from 1921 to 1933), refused his council to become susceptible to the beliefs of single 
civil servants and ministers. Posthuma himself roamed the corridors of government and 
state bureaucracy in order to secure a significant position of the Industrial Council in 
state governance at large. During the 1920s, he put much energy in having council 
members represented in a host of state commissions relating to new state services, such as 
the postal service, the railways and utility companies. When minister Verschuur aimed at 
the creation of a new overarching advisory body of experts in the early 1930s, Posthuma 
wanted to keep a special position for the employers’ and manufacturers’ interests, in the 
guise of the Industrial Council, as it “was historically entitled” to.31 In 1929, Posthuma 
publicized a report in which a full reorganisation of economic governance entailed the 
 NA, Archive IC, inv.nr. , minutes 20 November 9.
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inflation of existing advisory councils and a decrease of departmental activity.32 He be-
lieved economic regulation was much better off when ‘his’ befriended industrialists were 
in charge. Much of the Industrial Council’s meetings were dedicated to its position with 
regard to peer-institutions, government and state governance, mainly due to the perse-
verance of its chairman Posthuma. 
Another flamboyant chairman, A. I. M. G. Baron van Wijnbergen of the Council of 
the Self-Employed (1919–1940), who formally had a similar position to Posthuma, em-
ployed a whole different set of beliefs. Whereas communis opinio arose over the mitiga-
tion of group interest representation in the system of advisory bodies as a whole and 
the prominence of expertise was increasingly encouraged, Van Wijnbergen continued 
opting for the former. At the 100th meeting of the CSE in early 1928, he declared that 
the “CSE should become more and more a representative body”. And according to him, 
this direction necessarily implied the inclusion of a new electoral procedure for the coun-
cil’s representatives.33 This meant that the three unions of the self-employed (Catholic, 
Protestant and liberal) had to call for elections amongst their members to recruit their 
representatives. Van Wijnbergen strongly believed such reforms would ensure the CSE’s 
position as one of the main advisory councils of government. So whereas Posthuma 
boasted the Industrial Council’s importance within his personal network of state of-
ficials and members of government, Van Wijnbergen sought to reinforce the CSE from 
within, spurred by an unremitting belief in the fading paradigm of group representation 
(through elections). 
One could argue that the internal appeal of Van Wijnbergen who still championed the 
post-Versailles discourse of interlinking the state and society by means of functional 
representation and Posthuma’s extravert networking amounted to the same result: the 
ostracism of their respective councils from a new agenda that underpinned the politics of 
consultation which was based on fundamentally different orientations and beliefs. Their 
personal actions promoted an institutional change that would eventually result in an in-
creasing subordination to other advisory bodies. Put differently, the ‘situated agencies’ of 
Van Wijnbergen and Posthuma explain the beliefs and orientations with which they be-
lieved to advance the position of their respective rank and file, the self-employed and the 
industrialists. At the same time, they were informed by traditions that were seen as highly 
contested by a contrasting set of orientations and beliefs personified by other actors.  
These orientations and beliefs stemmed from the earlier mentioned tandem of the civil 
servant Hirschfeld and the minister of economic affairs Verschuur. To Hirschfeld, a high-
ly ambitious bureaucrat with strong beliefs in the technocratic organisation of economic 
governance, the primacy of interest representation which was so prominently engrained 
in the “ponderous organ” of the CEP was a residue of a previous era, unfit for his agenda 
2 N. N., Rapport van de Commissie van voorbereiding eener organisatie van den economischen voorlichtings-
dienst, 4 November 929, The Hague 929.
 NA, Archive Council for the Self-Emplyed (Middenstandsraad) [CSE], inv.nr. , minutes 22 May 928.
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of institutional and departmental reform.34 Moreover, Hirschfeld had hardly experienced 
any personal interference of the group of men who formed the pool of economic repre-
sentatives in the 1920s. He was – and felt – refrained from personal commitment and 
refused to take delicacies, vested interests and gentlemen’s agreements that had developed 
within the nexus of advisory councils during the early 1920s into account. As such, 
Hirschfeld’s situated agency was informed by a fundamental different set of beliefs and 
orientations than, for instance, Van Wijnbergen and Posthuma. He rooted in a tradition 
that was refrained from old boys’ networking and to a large degree was determined by the 
new meritocratic modes of authority – based non-legal higher educations in administra-
tion – burgeoning during the inter-war years. 
Hirschfeld’s superior, the Catholic minister of economic affairs Verschuur, was confront-
ed with the difficult challenge of survival as the first consequences of the economic cri-
sis surfaced: raising unemployment rates, plunging export figures and growing national 
debts. A newly devised advisory council, quick and sound in its response was imperative 
for Verschuur’s complex crisis policies. Existing advisory councils were largely neglected 
during the preparatory meetings for the new council. Posthuma’s advice to enlarge ex-
tra-departmental involvement in economic policies was put aside. Instead, Hirschfeld 
submitted a portfolio of recent reforms in foreign advisory councils that all showed a 
reflex toward the permanent inclusion of experts and the concomitant decline of extra-
parliamentary group representation.35 
In essence, Hirschfeld’s agenda of departmental reform and expansion in the realm of 
economic governance and Verschuur’s wish to have a group of fine advisory experts at 
his disposal converged into the main thrust behind the creation of the Economic Coun-
cil (Economische Raad) in 1932, an advisory board of 10 to 15 appointed experts from 
commerce, trade, industry and science. The explanatory memorandum of the council’s 
enactment disclosed the intent of Hirschfeld and Verschuur:
At this point, the government uses the services of various permanent colleges to be advised 
on economic matters […] However, the reason of existence of these colleges will end as 
soon as the Economic Council is established as the central advisory body. Their work will 
be transferred to the Economic Council […].36 
At the installation of the Economic Council minister Verschuur iterated the intentional 
deferment of group representation: 
I will not say this Economic Council is built on the principle of representation. Nor will 
I say that such a base is best. We have some experience with an economic advisory body 
based on the principle of representation, the CEP with its sub-commission. I believe this 
commission was not a success. We have seen foreign examples of economic councils with 
4 H. M. Hirschfeld, Actieve economische politiek, Amsterdam 946, p. 49; A. van der Zwan, H. M. Hirschfeld. In de 
ban van de macht, Amsterdam 2004, p. .
5 NA, Archive DTI, inv.nr. 862, Collection of foreign examples of advisory councils.
6 NA, Archive DTI, inv.nr. 047, Explanatory Memorandum Economic Council Act 8 July 92.
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a representative character as well. In Germany a grand body has been in existence which 
one can call an economic parliament. That experience puts into question if, at this point, 
the time is ripe for such endeavours, if there will be a right time for such bodies at all.37
From 1932 onwards, negotiations commenced about how to merge the existing advisory 
councils, such as the idle but still existing CEP, the Industrial Council and the Coun-
cil of the Self-Employed. The CEP was formally abolished in 1935. The government 
hardly ever consulted the other councils. Their self-initiated activities gradually became 
subjected to the rules and procedures defined by the Economic Council. In a non-ex-
planatory and descriptive vein, this change would qualify as a combination of layering 
(the Economic Council was formally put on top of existing bodies) and displacement 
(many of the advisory bodies’ tasks were displaced to the Economic Council) – two of 
the incremental modes of change defined by Mahoney and Thelen.
Such qualifications seem to describe rather than to explain the occurrence of modes 
of incremental institutional change. In contrast, a historicist interpretation of ‘situated 
agency’ as a micro-level social dynamic seems to be much more entitled to making claims 
about the explanation of institutional change ‘from within’. This agency-driven approach 
to institutional change is by all means not complete and exhausting. Many other actors 
may be inserted in the web of di- and converging beliefs, experiences and the dilemmas 
and traditions that ensued from them. However, this brief excursion into the micro-level 
politics of consultation in the inter-war Netherlands reveals how institutional change 
(i.e. from the primacy of interest representation to the primacy of expert input, and 
from the horizontally organised collection of advisory councils to a single hierarchical 
structure in close proximity to the government and the departments) can depend on 
individual actions of human agents in a contingent historical setting. 
6. Conclusion
Paradoxically, it seems that a decentred approach to institutional change rather meets 
the explanatory claims of neo-institutionalism, than historical institutionalist approaches 
which focus on meso and macro levels of institutional development. Even the theory 
of gradual institutional change, that postulates the incremental nature of institutional 
change, still seems to contribute to the description of processes and modes of changes. 
In contrast, I would argue that a decentred interpretation of agency substructures ex-
planations of institutional change. Human action renders visible institutional practice. 
Institutions reflect social realities and are constructed categories, perceived (temporary) 
structures that, simultaneously, enable possibilities and limitations of human action 
within a particular setting in time and space. As such, Anthony Giddens’s reciprocal 
relation between structure and agency – regardless of the semantic and technical falla-
7 NA, Archive Economic Council, inv.nr. 9, Annual report EC 9-95, pp. -4.
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cies – provides an epistemological fundament that, ultimately, allows for the decentred, 
agency-driven approach forwarded in this article. However, aspirations to explain insti-
tutional change are not entirely supported by the yields of Giddens’s framework. Bevir 
and Rhodes’s conception of agency does provide such support.
The languages of historical institutionalism and gradual institutional change theory do 
not convey their explanatory claims. Indeed, great transformative discourses about (dem-
ocratic) politics and government can be linked to the genesis and evolution of inter-war 
advisory bodies, but the register employed to address change fosters a descriptive nar-
rative rather than an explanatory one – i.e. displacement, layering, drift and conversion 
describe rather than explain modes of change.38 
Incremental, gradual change, I argue, is to be explained by decentering on human agency 
at a micro-level. To look at how ‘situated agency’ enables new social discourses that pose 
individually bound dilemmas, allows for a less reified and more fine-grained explanation 
of agency-driven institutional change than much of the neo-institutionalism offers to 
historical scholarship.  
8 M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice, pp. 7-7 (footnote ).
